Fuente: Historical Documents > Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976
Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Document 76a
76a. Editorial Note.
In June 1971, the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Ernest V. Siracusa, expressed concern to Washington that failure to support opponents of the anti-American and left-leaning military regime of Juan Jose Torres might leave the door open for communists to gain yet another foothold in the Americas. The CIA shared the Ambassador's concerns. In response to a White House request for a political action program to arrest the leftward trend of the Torres regime, a proposal was submitted to the 40 Committee for $410,000 in covert funding for the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and moderate military leaders, who opposed the Torres regime. Funds were designated for organizational expenses and a propaganda campaign utilizing Bolivian print and radio news media.
In July 1971, the 40 Committee met to consider the proposal. Responding to Under Secretary Johnson’s concern that the U.S. Government might be sponsoring a coup, Attorney General John Mitchell stated that his understanding of the proposal was that a coup was inevitable, and thus covert support should be targeted, as soon as possible, to pro-U.S. individuals or groups. Although the majority of the 40 Committee voted to approve the covert action proposal, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson indicated that he would demur on a decision until hearing Ambassador Siracusa’s opinion on the matter. In a message to Assistant Secretary Meyer, Ambassador Siracusa indicated that he opposed covert funding at $410,000, characterizing it as “coup money,” and suggested that the injection of such a sum into the MNR would be difficult to keep secret. Instead, the Ambassador suggested that more benefit might be derived from increasing economic assistance (specifically, economic aid) to the Torres Government to stabilize it, thus preserving U.S. influence with the regime. Notwithstanding Siracusa’s opposition, the covert funding was approved.
In August 1971, Arnold Nachmanoff, of the National Security Council Staff, informed Kissinger that the CIA had transferred funds to an ex-military figure involved in coup plotting, and another dissident officer. The money was meant to discourage a reportedly imminent coup and to "cement relations" with Bolivian military figures. Nachmanoff questioned the wisdom of having the CIA directly pass funds to opposition figures, and suggested that disclosure of the incident might open the U.S. Government to claims that it was intervening in Bolivian affairs. He indicated that no more direct transfers to Torres's opponents would occur without explicit permission from Washington. Two days later, General Hugo Banzer Suarez took control of the Bolivian Government in a coup, and the remaining funds approved for support of Torres's opponents were not needed.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976
Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Document 76a
76a. Editorial Note.
In June 1971, the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Ernest V. Siracusa, expressed concern to Washington that failure to support opponents of the anti-American and left-leaning military regime of Juan Jose Torres might leave the door open for communists to gain yet another foothold in the Americas. The CIA shared the Ambassador's concerns. In response to a White House request for a political action program to arrest the leftward trend of the Torres regime, a proposal was submitted to the 40 Committee for $410,000 in covert funding for the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and moderate military leaders, who opposed the Torres regime. Funds were designated for organizational expenses and a propaganda campaign utilizing Bolivian print and radio news media.
In July 1971, the 40 Committee met to consider the proposal. Responding to Under Secretary Johnson’s concern that the U.S. Government might be sponsoring a coup, Attorney General John Mitchell stated that his understanding of the proposal was that a coup was inevitable, and thus covert support should be targeted, as soon as possible, to pro-U.S. individuals or groups. Although the majority of the 40 Committee voted to approve the covert action proposal, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson indicated that he would demur on a decision until hearing Ambassador Siracusa’s opinion on the matter. In a message to Assistant Secretary Meyer, Ambassador Siracusa indicated that he opposed covert funding at $410,000, characterizing it as “coup money,” and suggested that the injection of such a sum into the MNR would be difficult to keep secret. Instead, the Ambassador suggested that more benefit might be derived from increasing economic assistance (specifically, economic aid) to the Torres Government to stabilize it, thus preserving U.S. influence with the regime. Notwithstanding Siracusa’s opposition, the covert funding was approved.
In August 1971, Arnold Nachmanoff, of the National Security Council Staff, informed Kissinger that the CIA had transferred funds to an ex-military figure involved in coup plotting, and another dissident officer. The money was meant to discourage a reportedly imminent coup and to "cement relations" with Bolivian military figures. Nachmanoff questioned the wisdom of having the CIA directly pass funds to opposition figures, and suggested that disclosure of the incident might open the U.S. Government to claims that it was intervening in Bolivian affairs. He indicated that no more direct transfers to Torres's opponents would occur without explicit permission from Washington. Two days later, General Hugo Banzer Suarez took control of the Bolivian Government in a coup, and the remaining funds approved for support of Torres's opponents were not needed.
Relaciones Exteriores de los Estados Unidos, 1969-1976
Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Document 76a Volumen E-10, Documentos sobre la Repúblicas Americanas, 1969-1972, 76 bis Documento
En junio de 1971, el embajador norteamericano en Bolivia, Ernest Siracusa V., expresó su preocupación a Washington que la falta de apoyo a los opositores de la Convención Americana y de izquierda anti-régimen militar de Juan José Torres podría dejar la puerta abierta a los comunistas para ganar otra punto de apoyo en las Américas. The CIA shared the Ambassador's concerns. La CIA compartían la preocupación del Embajador. In response to a White House request for a political action program to arrest the leftward trend of the Torres regime, a proposal was submitted to the 40 Committee for $410,000 in covert funding for the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and moderate military leaders, who opposed the Torres regime. En respuesta a una Casa de solicitud Blanca para un programa de acción política para frenar la tendencia hacia la izquierda del régimen de Torres, se presentó una propuesta a la Comisión de 40 de 410.000 dólares en fondos encubiertos para el Movimiento Revolucionario Nacional (MNR) y moderada líderes militares, que se opusieron a el régimen de Torres. Funds were designated for organizational expenses and a propaganda campaign utilizing Bolivian print and radio news media. Los fondos fueron destinados a gastos de organización y una campaña de propaganda utilizando prensa y la radio de noticias de prensa de Bolivia.
En julio de 1971, la Comisión 40 se reunió para examinar la propuesta. En respuesta a la subsecretaria de Johnson preocupación de que el Gobierno de los EE.UU. podría patrocinar un golpe de Estado, el Procurador General John Mitchell dijo que su comprensión de la propuesta era que un golpe era inevitable, y por lo tanto encubierta apoyo debería dirigirse, tan pronto como sea posible, para pro- EE.UU. individuos o grupos. Aunque la mayoría de la Comisión 40 votaron a favor de aprobar la propuesta de acción encubierta, Subsecretario U. Alexis Johnson indicó que algunas objeciones por una decisión hasta oír la opinión Embajador Siracusa en la materia. En un mensaje al Subsecretario Meyer, Embajador Siracusa indicó que se oponía a la financiación encubierta a 410.000 dólares, que lo caracterizan como "golpe de dinero", y sugirió que la aportación de dicha suma en el MNR sería difícil de mantener en secreto. En cambio, el embajador sugirió que más beneficios podrían derivarse de aumentar la ayuda económica (en concreto, la ayuda económica) al Gobierno de Torres para estabilizarlo, preservando así la influencia de EE.UU. con el régimen. A pesar de la oposición de Siracusa, la financiación encubierta ha sido aprobada.
En agosto de 1971, Arnold Nachmanoff, del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Personal, informó a Kissinger que la CIA había transferido fondos a una figura ex militares involucrados en la conspiración golpista, y otro general disidente. El dinero estaba destinado a disuadir a un golpe de Estado supuestamente inminente y para "consolidar las relaciones" con Bolivia figuras militares. Nachmanoff puso en duda la sabiduría de la CIA que pasan directamente los fondos a figuras de la oposición, y sugirió que la revelación de que el incidente podría abrir el Gobierno de los EE.UU. a las reclamaciones que iba a intervenir en los asuntos bolivianos. Indicó que ninguna transferencia más directa a los opositores de Torres se produciría sin el permiso explícito de Washington. Dos días después, el general Hugo Banzer Suárez tomó el control del Gobierno de Bolivia mediante un golpe, y el resto de los fondos aprobados para el apoyo de los opositores de Torres no eran necesarios.
